Political Cost Incentives for Managing the Property-Liability Insurer Loss Reserve

This paper examines the effect of rate regulation on the management of the property-liability insurer loss reserve. The political cost hypothesis predicts that managers make accounting choices to reduce wealth transfers resulting from the regulatory process. Managers may under-state reserves to justify lower rates to regulators. Alternatively, managers may have an incentive to report loss inflating discretionary reserves to reduce the cost of regulatory rate suppression. We find insurers over-state reserves in the presence of stringent rate regulation. Investigating the impact along the conditional reserve error distribution, we discover that a majority of the response occurs from under-reserving firms under-reserving less because of stringent rate regulation.     

UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES IN KOREAN AND U.S. EXECUTIVES’ STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS

Competitive positioning in a global market requires an understanding of the decision processes and behavioral attributes of executives from different countries. These attributes reflect the executives’ cultural background, the national policies under which they have worked, and their home country’s level of economic development (institutional context). The current research compared strategic decision models of U.S. and Korean executives and the results suggest that criteria employed by the executives from the two countries differ. Differences in institutional context between Korea and the U.S.A. were reflected in the weightings of objective criteria used by the executives. Korean executives emphasized industry attractiveness, sales and market share (because of policies that encourage growth) and U.S. executives emphasized projected demand, discounted cash flow and ROI (because of policies and institutions that focus on profitability). The results suggest the importance of understanding the strategic orientations of international competitors, partners in international strategic alliances and managers of international subsidiaries or divisions. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Financial Intermediaries and the Cross‐Section of Asset Returns

Financial intermediaries trade frequently in many markets using sophisticated models. Their marginal value of wealth should therefore provide a more informative stochastic discount factor (SDF) than that of a representative consumer. Guided by theory, we use shocks to the leverage of securities broker‐dealers to construct an intermediary SDF. Intuitively, deteriorating funding conditions are associated with deleveraging and high marginal value of wealth. Our single‐factor model prices size, book‐to‐market, momentum, and bond portfolios with an R² of 77% and an average annual pricing error of 1%—performing as well as standard multifactor benchmarks designed to price these assets.